Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/

Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations,　which had been established by the cabinet decision of May 24, 2011,terminated its mission with the submission of the Final Report to the Prime Minister on July 23, 2012 and was abolished by the cabinet decision of September 28, 2012.
The following is the archive of the committees’ activities.

Investigation Committee on the Accident at the Fukushima Nuclear Power Stations

This committee was established with the aim of conducting an investigation to determine the causes of the accident that occurred at Fukushima Daiichi and Daini Nuclear Power Stations of Tokyo Electric Power Company, and those of the damages generated by the accident, and thereby making policy proposals designed to prevent the expansion of the damages and the recurrence of similar accidents in the future.
 This committee is composed of ten members from academic and other fields, including Chairperson Yotaro Hatamura (professor emeritus at the University of Tokyo and professor at Kogakuin University). From a standpoint independent of the existing nuclear administration, the committee will conduct a comprehensive investigation of not only technical but also institutional problems, while placing emphasis on openness towards the Japanese public and the international community.
 We will make all possible efforts to conduct an investigation that are capable of answering all the questions harbored by people in Japan and all over the world, and standing up to critical evaluation of the history .

Investigation Report

2011.12.26　Interim Report
2012.07.23　 Final Report

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http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/seisaku/icanps/eng/final-report.html


Final Report
　 Summary of Final Report

Main Text
　Table of contents
　I. Introduction
　　1. Overview of the Investigation Committee
　　2. Activities of the Investigation Committee
　　3. The Relationship between the Final Report and Interim Report
　
　Ⅱ. The Damage and Accident Responses at the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS and the Fukushima Dai-ni NPS
　　1. The Damage at the Major Systems and Facilities of Units 1 to 3 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
　　2. Examination of a Hydrogen Gas Explosion
　　3. Response to the Accidents at Units 5 and 6 of the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
　　4. Restoration of External Power to the Fukushima Dai-ichi NPS
　　5. Response to the Accident at the Fukushima Dai-ni Nuclear Power Station
　
　III. Emergency Responses Required and Taken by Governments and Other Bodies
　　1. Emergency Responses Mandated in the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness Act, the
　　Basic Plan for Emergency Preparedness, etc.
　　2. Government Response after the Accident
　　3. Response Taken by Fukushima Prefectural Government after the Accident
　　4. TEPCO's Response after the Accident
　　5. Response of the Offsite Center after the Accident
　
　IV. Emergency Response Measures Primarily Implemented outside the Fukushima Dai-ichi Nuclear Power
Station in Response to the Accident
　　1. Environmental Radiation Monitoring
　　2. Utilization and Dissemination of Information Yielded by SPEEDI
　　3. Evacuation of Citizens
　　4. Measures Taken to Address the Risk of Radiation Exposure
　　5. Contamination of Agricultural, Livestock, Marine Products, the Air, Soil and Water
　　6. Occurrence and Treatment of Contaminated Water
　　7. Estimates of the Total amount of Radioactive Materials Discharged and an Evaluation of INES levels
　　8. Details of Events in Areas Where There may be Problems with the Provision of Information
　　to the Public
　　9. Details of Events in Areas where there may be Problems Concerning the Provision of Information
　　to the International Community
　
　V. Items to be Considered in Terms of Prevention of Accidents and Expansion of Damage
　　1. Safety Standards of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
　　2. Scientific Findings Concerning Earthquakes and Tsunami along the Japan Trench
　　3. Countermeasures against severe accidents
　　4. Details of the Process of Discussion on the Nuclear Emergency Preparedness System
　　5. Relationship with International Convention and International Standards
　　6. Organizational Structure as Regulatory Bodies for Nuclear Safety
　
　VI. Wrap-up and Recommendations
　　Introduction
　　1. Analysis of Major Problems
　　2. Recapitulation of Major Issues
　　3. Recommendations for Preventing Recurrences of Nuclear Disasters and for Mitigating Damages
　　Chairperson's Remarks
　
　 Attachments
　Table of contents　　Attachments①　　Attachments②　　Attachments③　



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