"What lessons have we learned from the Fukushima Nuclear Power Plant Accident of March 2011? "
※同時通訳です。日本語は左チャンネル、英語は右チャンネル
English : Choose a right channel
政府、国会、民間の福島原発事故調査委員会元委員長および事故当時、NRC委員長だったヤツコ氏を招き討論会を開催した。(ゲスト名は50音順)
■北澤宏一 元民間事故調委員長 Koichi Kitazawa, former chairman of the Independent Investigation Committee of the Fukushima Nuclear Accident)
■黒川清 元国会事故調委員長 Kiyoshi Kurokawa, former chairman of the Japanese Diet's Fukushima Nuclear Accident Independent Investigation Commission (NAIIC)
■畑村洋太郎 元政府事故調委員長 Yotaro Hatamura, former chairman of the Investigation Committee on the Fukushima Nuclear Accident
■グレゴリー・ヤツコ 前米国原子力規制委員会委員長 Gregory B. Jaczko, former chairman of the US Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)
Criminal error in TEPCO management of technology and damages given to "Brand Japan"
Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.) and Morinosuke Kawaguchi (Arthur D. Little (Japan), Inc.) (Fukushima Project Committee), News Release, Nov. 2011
Japanese page: 'Core problem in the TEPCO nuclear plant accident -- Similarity with the JR West train accident at Amagasaki', by Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.), Talk on Feb. 26, 2013 Posted on Sept. 20, 2013
==> See: FUKUSHIMA Report (2): The actual reason why this accident could not have been avoided, by Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.), Presented at ISIS2012 (posted on Oct. 3, 2013)
Editor's Note (Toru Nakagawa, Sept. 17, 2013)
In the Japanese page, I am posting an article 'Core problem in the TEPCO nuclear plant accident -- Similarity with the JR West train accident at Amagasaki', by Prof. Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.). I noticed the article published in a recent issue of Bulletin of YMCA, The University of Tokyo. The article was written down by Professor Yamaguchi on the basis of his talk at the YMCA on Feb. 26, 2013. On my request, Prof. Yamaguchi has allowed me to post here (a) the article in Japanese , (b) slides of the talk in Japanese , and (c) slide in English presented at a news release in Nov. 2011.
On the Fukushima nuclear plant accident, it is widely known that four mutually independent teams investigated and reported. They are:
(1) 'Minkan Jikocho': Voluntary independent group headed by Dr. Koichi Kitazawa, report of 412 pages in Japanese on Mar. 11, 2012.
(2) 'TEPCO Jikocho': Investigation committee inside TEPCO, interim report on Dec. 2, 2011 and final report on Jun. 20, 2012.
(3) 'Diet Jikocho': Investigation committee organized by the Diet and headed by Mr. Kiyoshi Kurokawa, report on Jul. 5, 2012.
(4) 'Government Jikocho': Investigation committee organized by the Government and headed by Prof. Yotaro Hatamura, interim report on Dec. 26, 2011, final report on Jul. 23, 2012.
Prof. Eiichi Yamaguchi has lead another team for investigation, i.e.
(5) 'Grass-root Jikocho': Fukushima Project, a voluntary independent group headed by Prof. Eiichi Yamaguchi, report of 503 pages on Jan. 30, 2012. As sumamrized in the present news release in English, his Project has revealed an importatnt aspect how and why the reactors lost the control to make the accident so disastrous. This pointing is important, I think, because the four other 'Jikochos' do not mention this point clearly.
Note (T. Nakagawa, Oct. 3, 2013): Prof. Yamaguchi's presentation in English at ISIS2012 is now posted .
Book Cover published in Japanese
Title page of this News Release
Structure of Reactors No. 2 and No. 3:
Graph presented by TEPCO. Even after the station black-out due to the tsunami attack at 15:28 on March 11, 2011, "the last fort" RCIC and sequentially HPCI kept cooling the reactor core of Unit 3 very well, which was hence in a controllable state for 35 hours until 02:44 on March 13.
presented by TEPCO. Even after the station black-out due to the tsunami attack at 15:28 on March 11, 2011, "the last fort" RCIC kept cooling the reactor core of Unit 2 very well, which was hence in a controllable state for 70 hours until 13:22 on March 14.
Yasushi HIBINO (Executive Vice-President of JAIST) testified that, in the evening on March 12, he and Prime Minister Naoto KAN strongly requested the management of TEPCO to make a decision of injecting sea water into the reactor pressure vessel after opening the vent as soon as possible within this controllable state. However, the management of TEPCO politely refused the request. Finally, TEPCO injected sea water at 09:25 on March 13, more than six hours after making the reactor uncontrollable. This refusal finally resulted in the majority of radioactive pollution. Precisely the same thing happened with Unit 2.
See: FUKUSHIMA Report (2): The actual reason why this accident could not have been avoided, by Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.), Presented at ISIS2012 (posted on Oct. 3, 2013)
The actual reason why this accident could not have been avoided
Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.),
Presented at the 3rd International Symposium on Innovation Strategy (ISIS2012), held on Sept. 11, 2012, at University of Cambridge, UK
Japanese page: 'Core problem in the TEPCO nuclear plant accident -- Similarity with the JR West train accident at Amagasaki', by Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.), Talk on Feb. 26, 2013
Posted on Oct. 3, 2013
==> See: FUKUSHIMA Report (1): Criminal error in TEPCO management of technology and damages given to "Brand Japan" by Eiichi Yamaguchi (Doshisha Univ.) and Morinosuke Kawaguchi (Arthur D. Little (Japan), Inc.) (Fukushima Project Committee), News Release, Nov. 2011 (Posted on Sept. 20,2013)
Editor's Note (Toru Nakagawa, Sept. 29, 2013)
This page is Prof. Yamaguchi's Fukushima Report in English in a more readable form than the page posted a week ago.
On the Fukushima Report posted a week ago, Mr. Richard Platt asked us to translate Yamaguchi's Japanese article into English for better readability. Prof. Yamaguchi sent me a PPT file of his English presentation at ISIS2012 held at University of Cambridge on Sept. 11, 2012. This page posts the presentation slides with the narration note in the text.
For further reference, you will find the following Web sites and articles useful:
Good morning. My name is Eiichi Yamaguchi from Doshisha University. Now, we would like to begin with the Special Session "Essential Cause of the Fukushima Nuclear Plant Accident" in the 3rd International Symposium on Innovation Strategy (ISIS-2012).
First, I will give a lecture about "The actual reason why this accident could not have been avoided". Here, I will make it clearly understandable how the accident occurred. I am sure you never need technical background. You will find it so easy to understand the essential cause of the accident. Here I will show you only 16 slides, which are already uploaded to the server. So, if you go to the ISIS web site, you will get the pdf of each slide like this.
The next one is an invited talk entitled "The engineering ethics as the key to bind the business and scientific knowledge - Case of two nuclear power plants: Fukushima and Onagawa" written by Taku HIRANO and Professor FUJIMURA from Tokyo Inst. Technology.
We will have a coffee break after that, but please make sure that we will take the photo during the break. Please come to the outside and we will take your picture.
Finally, Professor Sabine ROESER from Delft University of Technology will give an invited talk about "Fukushima, risk and moral emotions". .
Now, I will start my talk entitled "The actual reason why this accident could not have been avoided". This is an executive summary of FUKUSHIMA Report, and during the talk I will circulate this book.
As shown in the photo, Destroyed part of Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station consists of four units. Here, No.1, No. 3 and No.4 are destroyed at the top floor because of hydrogen explosion. Since No. 4 was out of operation, the hydrogen is supposed to be leaked from No.3.
From now on to the forth slide, I will use the same four slides as I used in the last year to make you understand clearly.
This shows the location of commercial nuclear power stations in Japan. As shown here, there are 17 nuclear power stations. Each contain several plants so that there are 50 nuclear plants in Japan.
All the nuclear plants are now out of operation except for two, which is No.3 and No.4 at Oi nuclear plant station.
Fukushima Daiichi Station is located 200 km far from Tokyo, and 700 km far from Kyoto.
On 15th of March, TEPCO wanted to evacuate all the employees of Fukushima Daiichi at the midnight of 14th of March, 2011, but Prime Minister Kan scolded the president of TEPCO as "Japan will be completely destroyed if you evacuate them. " at 3 am on 15th of March. Actually, if they were evacuated on 15th of March, even Tokyo would be radioactivated.
It is interesting that, near the Fukushima Daiichi Station, there are two nuclear stations. One is TEPCO Fukushima Daini Nuclear Station within 20 km south. The other is Tohoku EPCO Onagawa Nuclear Station.
The reason why Onagawa Nuclear Station was saved will be discussed by Professor Fujimura at the second lecture of this special session.
Fukushima Daini was located at the same sea level as Daiichi, it was damaged by 14 m Tsunami but it was finally saved because the external electricity was alive.
On the other hand, at the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station, external electricity as well as the emergency power generator were destroyed, so that these No.1, 2, 3 and 4 plants confronted severe accident.
As shown in this photo, the facilities at the sea coast was completely destroyed. Since the emergency power generator was situated at the basement floor, all became out of control after tsunami.
Here I must note one essential point. All the mass media have reported that, after the tsunami, all the station became black-out, and that these nuclear plant immediately lost their control. However, it is not true. As a matter of fact, there is the last fortification which keep cooling the reactor core for eight hours or more than 20 hours.
This figure illustrates the piping configuration of No. 1 reactor for Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Station. In this Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV), steam generated by nuclear fission in this nuclear fuel goes to the turbine and generates the electric power. Then, the steam is made water by tremendous amount of sea water at the condenser, and come back to RPV. If this water current is stopped due to some reason, the control rod would be inserted into the fuel rod and stop the nuclear fission. Nevertheless, decay heat would continuously be generated, and boil the water in RPV. In order not to prevent the explosion of RPV due to the generated steam, you have to inject the fresh water from this water tank by HPCI (High Pressure Core Injection) pump as well as by CS (Core Spray) pump. Simultaneously, this Safety Relief Valve (SRV) will be open to decrease the pressure in RPV. This set of HPCI, CS and SRV is called ECCS (Emergency Core Cooling System). However, these pumps are operated by the external power. so that ECCS would not work without any external power.
In such sever cases, there is the last fortification for No.1 reactor. This is isolation condenser, IC. The IC can passively work without external power, in which generated steam is automatically delivered to the pool and cool down to the water. This IC can work for about 8 hours.
I explained this last fortification of No.1 last year, so this year I would like to explain the last fortification of No. 2 and No.3 reactors.
As shown in this figure, No. 2 and 3 reactors have the evolved last fortification as shown in this figure. Instead of IC, there is RCIC, Reactor Core Injection Cooling Systems. Namely, the steam from RPV can rotate this pump. Then, this pump can draw up the water in the suppression chamber. The RCIC, the last fortification for No.2 and 3 reactors is designed to work for more than 20 hours.
At this opportunity, I would like to show the investigation of No.2 and 3 reactors, so please focus of this type of the last fortification, the RCIC.
To make the following explanation clearly understandable, please remember these three physical quantities.
The first quantity is the water level in RPV which is measured from the top of active fuel.
If the water level is positive, the fuel is completely immersed in the water and in the controllable state. On the other hand, the water level is negative, a part of the fuel is exposed in the steam, and then generates tremendous amounts of decay heat. Once the water level is negative, the melt-down process will start to produce radio-isotopes, Iodine 131, Cesium 134 and 137 etc., and the core is in the uncontrollable state. So, human-being MUST try to keep the water level positive. In other words, this quantity clearly shows the border of physics limit.
The second quantity is the pressure in RPV. The RPV is designed to resist high pressures at most 83 atmosphere. To prevent the explosion of RPV, this safety relief valve (SRV) is designed to automatically open when the pressure in RPV exceeds 65 atmosphere.
The third quantity is the pressure in Primary Containment Vessel (PCV). The PCV is designed to resist the pressure up to 3.8 atm at maximum for No.2 and N. 3 reactors.
Here, I have to note that, if the water level is decreased toward zero, you MUST inject the sea water from this fire pump line. To do so, you have to decrease the pressure in RPV below 6 or 8 atmosphere by opening the SRV. But if you open the SRV, the pressure in PCV will be increased to result in the explosion of PCV. This will be the hell like Chernobyl. Therefore, to avoid it, you have to open the vent as soon as possible. However, if you open the vent after the uncontrollable state, radioactive cesium and iodine will be emitted out to the atmosphere. Therefore, the vent MUST be opened by hand within the controllable state with positive water level.
Now you are the professionals of atomic nuclear plant. It is not nuclear science but just high pressure technology. It is quite easy to understand.
First, let us analyze the time evolution of water level for No.3 reactors.
The RCIC for No.3 manually turned on just after the earthquake at 1505. That is why the RCIC kept cooling the core even when the ECCS was turned off due to the Tsunami at 1527. However, the RCIC was off at 1136 on 12th of March, due to some human error. But very fortunately the HPCI, which is a part of ECCS, was automatically turned on 1 hour later at 1235 on 12th. The HPCI kept working until 244 on 13th of March.
So, I conclude that the No.3 reactor was in a controllable state for 36 hours due to the RCIC and then HPCI. However, from this point when HPCI was off, the reactor soon was entering into an uncontrollable state, and the negative water level gave the core melt down, producing tremendous amount of radioactive materials.
This figure shows the time evolution of pressures in RPV by red circle, and pressures in PCV by blue circles. You will find a strange phenomenon for pressures in RPV in the afternoon on 12th. Do you understand why the strong drop of pressures up to almost about 8 atmosphere?
Yes, this is the period while HPCI was working from here to here. The HPCI has the cooling capacity of 10 times more than RCIC. That is why the core was cooled very well in this time region. This means that if TEPCO inject sea water during the time when pressures were below 10 atm, you do not have to even open the vent. However TEPCO did not. TEPCO even refused it. Then several hours after the reactor is in the uncontrollable phase here at 847, they finally opened the vent. Due to that, radioisotopes of cesium and iodine were emitted into the outside environment.
They decided to inject sea water at 925, but it was too late. Too ridiculous.
So, now you completely understand that if CEO or CTO of TEPCO made a clear decision of sea water injection during this period in the afternoon on 12th of March, Fukushima people and the people on the globe would never suffer from the radioactive pollution from No.3.
This figure shows the time evolution of water level for No. 2 reactors. As you can see from this figure, the RCIC kept working for 69 hours, which is almost 3 days. During the RCIC working, the water level was maintained around 4m, which made the reactor within a controllable state.
But finally the RCIC was shut off at 1322 on 14th, because it has finite life time, Then, the reactor was in the uncontrollable phase around 5pm on 14th. After the melt down of core, TEPCO finally injected sea water, but again it was too late to recover the reactor from uncontrollable state.
That is the nature.
This figure shows pressure in RPV by red and pressure in PCV by blue.. As you can see easily, the pressure in RPV was maintained below 65 atm, due to the SRV release. That is why the pressure in PCV was increased gradually, and finally exceeded the maximal limit 3.8 atm. Here, you can see abrupt increase of the pressure in RPV here after the runaway of the reactor, then sudden drop of pressure in RPV at here. Do you understand what happened here.
Yes, the RPV had cracks and tremendous amount of radioactive materials came out here. They finally injected sea water at 1954 but again too late.
So, now you completely understand that if CEO or CTO of TEPCO made a clear decision of sea water injection during this period in the afternoon on 12th of March, Fukushima people and the people on the globe would never suffer from the radioactive pollution from No.2. As a matter of fact, the radioactive pollution from No.3 and No.2 are five times bigger than from No.1, which means that the damage from radioactive pollution would be one sixth.
So, now we were trying our best to find out the reason why TEPCO management could not make any decision to inject sea water in the evening on 12th of March, 2011.
Finally, we succeeded in happening to meet Lady Luck, Dr. Hibino. Hibino was a colleague when I worked for NTT Basic Research Labs as a physicist. Dr. Hibino was a computer scientist, but originally a physicist. He was a very good friend of Prime Minister Kan, and only trustable scientist for Kan. On the other hand, all other nuclear technologist around Prime Minister Kan was the residents of the so-called nuclear village.
After the accident, Kan called Hibino and asked Hibino to come to the Prime Minister's House immediately. Then, Hibino saw everything what happened in the evening on 12th of March.
And, Hibino finally testified as follows:
When I arrived at the Prime Minister's Official Residence (Kantei) at 21:00 on March 12, Prime Minister Kan had started to get the feeling that the same thing might possibly happen to reactors No.2 and No.3 as No.1. And, Kan has frequently instructed that TEPCO should forestall the situation. However, TEPCO stalled the vents and sea water injection with the reason that the RCIC was still working.
So, on the grounds that there was still working cooling system in place, they chose to delay opening the vent and inject sea water into the reactor vessels.
Prime Minister Kan asserted that even if we were to say that the RCIC had indeed been functioning as intended, (as there was no heat coming out of the containment area), we can infer that the heat and pressure more than likely continued to gradually build up as it had nowhere to escape. Which is exactly why they should have quickly opened up the vents and inject sea water into the reactors immediately to cool down the out of control reactors. However, Representative of TEPCO refused.
With regard to the accident which occurred in the Fukushima Daiichi Nuclear Power Station, this enormous problem was not only limited to the scopes of technology and management involved, but also to the undermining of the fundamental government's safety and security policies. There will be nothing more valuable for the future than the lessons that we can learn through awareness and analysis of this catastrophe (and in addition to altering the future strategy for Technology Management and the Nation). From this kind of awareness, we can guess that TEPCO and the Government involved had control over the content in the investigation reports that were released to the media. Additionally, most well-informed people will probably look at this and publish their own works based on the controversy that lies within. As for the first part of this work, it will simply talk about the fact that we cannot deny the possibility that it simply just reflects the intentions of the main people who are behind the scenes pulling the strings (being those who possess the largest financial interests therein). The content of the latter part, being based on market principles, will talk about the level of absurdity and irresponsibility of those people who are trying to run away from the problem at hand. Based on these circumstances, our objectives, of this book which we will publish, are to use all efforts to investigate, analyze and think about how these outsiders (who were affected) must be feeling and then take the lessons learned and then let them be known to the future generations through one suggestion which will be presented in depth.
●An appeal will be made for contributions and then this capital will be used to organize and publish a report. We will call this book the “Fukushima Project”, In order to promote this book we will organize a committee. The planning and editing for this book will be handled by the editing department in the organization that exists under the committee. The profitable information gathered from the report will be edited and compiled into a book by this editing department. The committee will personally entrust appropriate individuals and companies with the responsibility of determining what information is relevant and appropriate for publishing.
●In the case that someone who donates money does not want personal information such as their name displayed in the back of the book it will be removed as desired.
●We, the Fukushima Committee, are going to conduct this research free of charge and in doing so renounce all royalties made from sales of this book.
●We, the Fukushima Committee, are going to conduct this research free of charge and in doing so renounce all royalties made from sales of this book.
●Contributions will be used to pay expenses related to research and investigation, as well as, printing costs and other associated costs necessary to complete this project. To be more specific, one example of the previously mentioned associated costs will be incurred in setting up a web page to provide information related to our findings to the public.
●If we receive more than the desired amount, then the remainder will be donated to the victims affected through an appropriate organization (such as Red Cross).
●If the amount of contributions received is less than the amount, in the event that it leads to difficulties in the publication of this work, the publication will be produced as an electronic version or through some other means in order to inform the public of our findings.
●There will be 2 versions for this publication: a book and a digest version. The digest will not require a copyright fee and will provide a free electronic copy at the viewers request. Electronic copies will also be provided for free at viewers request. We will also provide translations of the book for free upon request.
●This book will be released into the market as well as a regular subscription which will also be provided at the lowest price possible.
●The sales incurred from the book and the detailed report will be used to first pay for commissions, public relations, post-survey activities, etc. and then the remaining amount will be donated to the victims affected through an appropriate organization (such as Red Cross).
●The committee which organized the "Fukushima Project", which consists of well-informed individuals from all over the world including Japan (being individuals with no conflict of interest in relation to this incident), will be in charge of the survey and analysis of this incident.
●The costs associated with the collecting information and materials collection activities, the holding of committee meetings, etc. and other required fees from operating costs will be covered through the collected donations previously mentioned above.
(October 25, 2011)
Chapter 1 - Covers events which took place between March 11, 2011 and May 15, 2011.
1.1 How did the TEPCO Power Plant Accident occur?
1.2 How did the first reactor reach an uncontrollable state?
1.3 How did the second and third reactors reach an uncontrollable state?
1.4 March 15 - A Sudden Change
1.5 What are obvious measures that need to be taken?
Chapter 2 - An account of the events which took place up until March 11, 2011.
2.1 A country's safety system which cannot prevent accidents from happening.
2.2 Everything about this was foreseeable.
2.3 The ambiguity of where fault lies within a Privatized System of National Policy.
Chapter 3 - An account of the events which took place onward from May 15, 2011.
3.1 An overview of what measures have been taken to deal with the accident thus far.
3.2 Verification of accident prevention countermeasures.
3.3 Problems that currently exist within TEPCO, NISA and Government Correspondence.
3.4 Victim Compensation Scheme
3.5 What has Journalism covered? What has it not covered?
Chapter 4 - Potential severity of damages incurred due to radiation
Chapter 5 - Taking into consideration financial damage caused by harmful rumors or misinformation.
5.1 The seriousness of rumors.
5.2 How each medium of media gathers and processes information.
5.3 "Trial" as a means of doing something
5.4 Trial for function and verification.
5.5 Another device for bringing things to light
5.6 General remarks regarding
"Language Barriers"
"Wall of Shame" brought about by "Suspicious News Reports"
"The Influence Social Media Holds-A Foreign Journalist's Experience"
Chapter 6 - How Europe saw Fukushima on 3.11.
6.1 How England saw Fukushima on 3.11
6.2 How France saw Fukushima on 3.11
6.3 How Germany saw Fukushima on 3.11Chapter 7 - What Japan's Atomic Energy Policy had been pursuing.
Chapter 7 - What Japan's Atomic Energy Policy had been pursuing.
7.1 Policy with a goal to realize Fast Breeder Reactors in over half a century.
"The battle concerning reprocessing and the fluctuation in government policy"
"How Korea and Taiwan deal with the disposal of used up nuclear fuel"
Chapter 8 - What the power plant has brought about to the region.
8.1 Colonial Four Layer Structure
8.2 Atomic Power has brought about increased employment and wealth.
8.3 Dependence upon power plants - Without power plants our economy would cease to exist as we know it.
8.4 Primary location--In recent years, power plant internal expansion has become mainstream
8.5 Future sites for power plants after "3.11"
Chapter 9 - The costs incurred with nuclear power plants and the financial costs of the electricity they produce.
9.1 The actual cost performance of power plants
9.2 The costs involved with nuclear power plants
9.3 Financial costs of electricity-Overall cost formula
Chapter 10 - Power plant modernization henceforth
10.1 Power plant modernization moving from developed nations to developing nations
10.2 Arguments and opinions regarding Safety and Security
10.3 Views on the modernization of new technology and new products.
Chapter 11 - Henceforth
11.1 Population shrinkage in Japan and the supply and demand of energy
11.2 Global Warming due to carbon dioxide
11.3 The irrationality behind the "Fast Breeder Reactors-Reprocessing" plan.
11.4 Can Japan, a country prone to earthquakes, really afford to rely on power plants?
11.5 Separation of electrical power production from power distribution and transmission / Smart Grids / Energy storage.
11.6 Arguments on protecting industries
11.7 Possibilities and limitations of renewable energy sources
11.8 Japanese social norms and the Fukushima power plant accident
Appendix:
A-1 Atomic Energy
A-2 Mechanisms for electricity produced from atomic energy
A-3 Boiling Water Reactory
A-4 Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel
A-5 Fast Breeder Reactors
A-6 Pluthermal (Plutonium-Phermal)
A-7 Unprecedented Accidents of the Past
・March 2011
: Project begins.
・April 2011
: Committee is organized and information collection begins.
・August 2011
: Set up Home Page and begin to gather contribution funds to write, edit, publish etc.
・November 2011
: (Current Plan) - Put the book into the market for sale as well as a Digest.
Chief Founder
Hiroyuki Mizuno (Vice President at Osaka Electro-Communications University and the former Vice President of Panasonic)
Committee Chairman
Eiichi Yamaguchi (Professor of Doshisha University, Deputy Director of ITEC)
Editing Department Manager
Nishimura Yoshio (A Visiting Professor of Politics in the Graduate Program at Waseda University)
Committee Member
Hiroyuki Kawai (Lawyer, Co-Partner at Sakura Kyodo Law Offices)
Committee Member
Shunji Iio (Associate Professor of Nuclear Engineering at Tokyo Institute of Technology
Committee Member
Tomohiro Nakamori (Nikkei BP Consulting Chief Strategist)
Committee Member
Morinosuke Kawaguchi (Arthur D. Little (Japan), Associate Director)
Committee Member
Koujirou Honda (Doshisha University ITEC Research Assistant)
Copyright (c) 2011 FUKUSHIMA PROJECT All rights reserved. The creator of this web site is one of the Members of the Fukushima Project Committee Any Questions about this website should be directed to the "Fukushima Project" Secretariat at info@f-pj.org
Born in 1929. In 1952, after graduating from Kyoto University's Faculty of Science he acquired employment at Matsushita Electric Industrial Co., Ltd.. In 1985, he became a director at Panasonic. In 1990, he received the sole responsibility for activities related to technology when he became a Vice-President (at Panasonic). He served as a representative of the US-Japan Semiconductor Council (having understood the changes that occurred during the IT Revolution). After retiring from Panasonic in 1993, he went to serve as an advising professor at Stanford University, Georgetown University, Ritsumeikan University, Ryukoku University etc., and has been engaged in research activities in both the US and Japan as well as Served as Vice President at Kochi University of Technology. He is currently a Vice President of Osaka Electro-Communication, serves on the Board of Directors at Hiroshima Prefectural Institute of Industrial Science and Technology, Professor Emeritus at Kochi University of Technology, an Adviser to the Shiga Prefecture local government, Chairman at the Japan Productivity Center for Technology Management, serves on the Board of Directors at Konami, Chairman of the Technical Advisor Japan E-Si, Senior Adviser at Olympus Capital Holdings, serves on the Board of Directors at 45 Corporation and serves as an Adviser to Intellectual Ventures Japan, etc.
Born in 1955. He graduated from Department of Physics, Faculty of Science, the University of Tokyo in 1977. He received D.Sc. degree in Physics from the University of Tokyo in 1984. He joined NTT in 1979 and worked for the Musashino Electrical Communication Laboratories. From 1984 to 1985, He worked as a Visiting Scholar at University of Notre Dame in U.S.A. From 1986 to 1998, he was a Senior Research Scientist, Supervisor, of NTT Basic Research Laboratories. Between 1993 and 1998, he was invited to be a Chief Scientist of IMRA Europe in France. From 1999 to 2003, he was an Executive Fellow of the 21st Century Public Institute at the Federation of Economic Organizations. In 2003, he was appointed to be a Professor of Doshisha University. From 2006 onward he has been serving as an Adjunct Fellow of CRDS (Center for Research and Development Strategy) at Japan Science and Technology Agency. From 2008 to 2009, he served as a Visiting Fellow of Clare Hall at the University of Cambridge in U.K. He founded venture startup companies such as ArcZone (1998), Powdec (2001) and ALGAN (2005), and serves on the board of directors for them.
Main Works Include
"Root for the JR Fukuchiyama Train Incident -- Rethinking Corporate Social Responsibility from Science" (NTT Publication, 2007), "Recovering from Success: Innovation And Technology Management in Japan" (Oxford University Press, 2006) Co-Author, "Innovation and Disruption and Resonance"(NTT Publication, 2006), "The Science Industry" (NTT Publication, 2003) Co-Author, "The Test Tube in the middle of the Sun" (Kodansha, 1993) "Synthesis and Properties of Boron Nitride" (Trans Tech Publication, 1990) etc.
Born in 1942. He received the B.E., M.E. and Ph.D. degrees in electronics, all from the Tokyo Institute of Technology, in 1965, 1967, and 1971, respectively. From 1967 to 1968, he studied at the Solid-State Electronics Research Center of the University of Montpellier, France. During his doctoral studies, he was engaged in research on microwave semiconductor devices and semiconductor lasers. In 1971, he joined Nikkei-McGraw-Hill, Inc. (presently Nikkei Business Publications, Inc.), where he experienced editor-in-chief of the Nikkei Electronics magazine, publisher of various publications and R&D bureau director. From 2002 to 2003, he was with The University of Tokyo as a professor of The Graduate School of Engineering. From 2004 to 2009, he was an auditor of Tokyo Institute of Technology. Also from 2004 to present, he is a visiting professor of Waseda university, where he has been engaged in the education of journalists in the Graduate School of Political Science. During these years, he has also been with Nikkei Business Publications Inc. as an editorial advisor. From 2009 to present, he serves to Tokyo Institute of Technology as a special advisor to the president.
He is the author of books such as
"Technology and Culture of Silico-Lithic Age" (Nihon Keizai Shimbun, 1985), "Future of Semiconductor Industry" (Maruzen, 1995), "Industry-University Collaboration" (Nikkei Business Publications, 2003), "Information Industry" (University of Air Publications, 2004), and "Education of Journalists in Science and Technology" (TDU Publications, 2010).
Born in 1944. In 1968, received undergraduate degree in Law from Tokyo University. In 1970, became a registered Lawyer. In 1972, established Sakura Kyodo Law Offices. In 1977, studied abroad (short-term at the Dallas International and Comparative Law Center. In 1986 and 1987, served as Chairman at the Second Tokyo Bar Association. Specialized in Collective Debt management, Debt Collection, Company Law Relations, International Transaction Relations, intellectual property rights such as copyrights, industrial property, patent, trademark, as well as dealt with the Douglas Grumman case, relations dealing with the acquisition of abandoned Chinese Orphans, Head of the Lawyer's Association area responsible for the suspension lawsuits against the Hamaoka Nuclear Power Station (He happens to be a Guru in this field), Chairman of a group which supports the National Acquisition of abandoned Chinese orphans, on the board of directors of a supporting foundation of the FASF Corporate abandoned Chinese orphans, a representative for the board of directors for a natural energy dot com company, Auditor of Save the Children Japan (Public Association) as well as serves as the Vice President of the Japan Federation of Bar Associations' Commission for Environmental Pollution Control etc..
Born in 1955. In 1978, graduated from the Department of Physics at Tokyo University. In 1983, completed his Doctoral degree in Physics at Tokyo University and following his graduation he received employment at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute and joined a group which conducted experiments using the JT-60 (A Large sized Tokamak Device). He also did research on and performed other duties related to the maintenance on the instrument measuring devices, particle confinement, energy confinement, H-mode, and studies related to properties of Divertors. During this time, he was sent abroad twice (once for an 8 month period between 1985-1986 working with JET Undertaking in England and again for a 2 month period in 1990 working at the Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory in America). In 1992, he became the Vice Senior Researcher at the Japan Atomic Energy Research Institute, was Group leader for "research on Particle Impurities Control and Plasma Boundaries" and therefore, in charge of, and lead, experiments which used the JT-60. In 1995, became an Assistant Professor of the Nuclear Reactor Engineering Graduate Faculty at the Tokyo Institute of Technology. From 2007, his current position (title changed in 2008), Supervisor of the Plasma and Fusion Research Association.
Born in 1959. After graduating from Waseda University with a Degree in Applied Chemistry, became employed at OKI's Research Laboratories performing research related to thin-film devices, crystal growth method etc.. In 1989, since joining Nikkei Business Publications, Inc. he served as a reporter for the Nikkei Electronics Magazine since he was involved with R&D, consumer electronics, displays, peripherals, and other fields related to electronic devices. In addition, over the years he also served as an Magazine Associate Editor (Nikkei Electronics Magazine), Editor-in Chief of Nikkei Mechanical (Now known as Nikkei Monozukuri), Editor-in Chief of Nikkei Automotive Technology, Editor-in Chief of Nikkei BizTech, Editor-in Chief of NVC Online and served on the Editorial Board of the Bureau of Electronics and Mechanics. Since 2010, (current position) he has been working at the Tokyo Institute of Technology as a Part-time Lecturer and Program Officer, Supervisor of the Nanotechnology Forum at Waseda University, Technical Evaluation Committee Chairman for the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development Organization (NEDO), among other endeavors.
Born in 1961. Graduated from Keio University's Faculty of Engineering with a Bachelors Degree in Applied Chemistry. Received an MS in Chemistry at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Before joining Arthur D. Little, he worked at the Kansai Research Institute, a technology consulting firm focusing on evaluating the marketability of each type of manufacturing technology, building technology strategy, setting IP strategy. Prior to becoming a consultant, he worked as an engineer for 15 years at Hitachi Co. Ltd, where he gained experience in product development, as well as materials and production technology R&D for their OA equipment, household appliances, and heavy industry equipment businesses. Kawaguchi is Principal, Associate Director for Arthur D. Little (Japan), Inc, the global strategy consulting firm. His main areas of expertise include an array of strategic issues focusing on the electronics, precision instruments, machine and chemical manufacturing industries. He is an expert in Management of Technology (MOT), Intellectual Property Management (IPM), and Technology and Innovation Management (TIM) in various industries such as telecommunications, electronics and the car industry. His book “Otaku de onnanoko na kuni no monozukuri” received the Nikkei BP BizTech Book Award in 2008. This book has been translated into Korean, Chinese, Thai and English.
In 1995, he graduated from the Tokyo University of Agriculture with a degree in Bio-active Substances from the Engineering Department. In 1997, graduated from the Applied Sciences Biological Systems Master's Program at Doshisha University before entering the Ph. D program. In the same year he was accepted to the Philosophy of Science Undergraduate Program at Hokkaido University. In 2000, he graduated and then went back for his Masters in Thought Cultural Studies. In 2003, he graduated and then progressed to the Doctoral Program in the same field. In 2008, after completing a few courses in the Ph. D program he decided to take some time off. From 2005-2008, he worked as a Full-time Lecturer in the Basic Education Department at the Kanazawa Institute of Technology. From 2008-2011, he worked as a Full-time Lecturer in the Business Department at Doshisha University. Currently, he is working on various research activities as a Research Assistant in the ITEC Department at Doshisha University.
Copyright (c) 2011 FUKUSHIMA PROJECT All rights reserved. The creator of this web site is one of the Members of the Fukushima Project Committee Any Questions about this website should be directed to the "Fukushima Project" Secretariat at info@f-pj.org
Here are the graphs depicting the evolution of the main parameters of Fukushima NPP1 reactors (unit1 to unit3) since the accident. You can find similar and additional interesting graphs on this other website from a Brazilian University, as well as, since 5/17, from TEPCO themselves. You may also find worth reading NISA’s own interpretation of what happened on the first stages of the accident.
All data and graphics are available online at the following online Excel workbook, which I update more frequently than the graphs bellow. Most NISA/METI PRs can be downloaded here.
…
Evolution highlights
[04/14] Added “under investigation” tags to the graphs following NISA press releases. According to TEPCO they are simply not sure all indicators are working properly, and they are closely following a number of “suspect” ones.
[04/18] Added several new sensors as provided by TEPCO/NISA (noteworthy are those with PCV temperature info); Hope the graphs are still relatively easy to read, but I’m open for any suggestion so please don’t hesitate to comment.
[05/22] Added “water injection rate” graphs to help understanding other params evol.
[06/04] TEPCO installed a new temporary pressure measuring system on #1 RPV (details).
[06/21] Facing continuous problems with radioactive water purification facility, TEPCO decided to lower water injection on all 3 reactors in a bid to reduce storage filling pace.
[06/24] TEPCO gained access to #2 and installed pressure meas syst, corrected water level.
…
TEPCO’s recovery roadmap evolution
[04/17]1st Version; 6-9 months to stabilize the situation ; don’t expect sub 100ºC core temp in the next 3 months
Core height is approximately 4.5m (here are the actual specs).
At the very beginning of the accident all 3 units spent some hours without any water on the core after losing their cooling systems. You can see more details on the evolution of the accident early stages in this PPT from Areva’s Dr Braun .
Since then all cores remain above half filled with water, which was sea-water at the beginning then progressively changed for fresh water. An early NRC report (thx Joe Wein) suggested half filled cores would indicate likely failure from recirculation pump seals, but as you can see most sensors are closer to 66% (normal value estimated by NRC) than 50%, so I wonder if that early assessment was accurate.
[5/11] After gaining access to the interior of n1, TEPCO operators said to have “corrected” #1-A gauge, which was found to be “down-scale” (i.e. core empty). Since temperature is low all over the reactor the fuel is assumed to have completely melted down and reached the bottom of the RPV where it’s kept cool. As of 6/27 TEPCO keeps on repporting #1-B (half filled core) as well.
[6/06] Tepco is closely investigating the evolution of all water level gauges (except #1-A)
[6/22] Tepco gained access to #2 reactor building and tried to correct gauge level; corrected level[6/24] remains about 1/2 filled core, but TEPCO is still not sure of their “new calibration”.
Properly cooled down reactor RPV pressure is ~ 0 to 0.1 MPa gauge
RPV normal operating pressure is ~ 7MPa, max. design pressure ~ 8.7 MPa
[06/04] TEPCO installed a new temporary measuring system on #1 RPV (details), showing a low pressure level, similar to that in #2 and #3. I removed previous data because it was obviously wrong; you can still find it here if you feel like it.
Properly cooled down reactor PCV (DW or SC) pressure is just above atm pressure (~ 0.1 MPa abs)
Whenever pressure approaches design max. TEPCO is forced to “vent” to prevent any risk of containment failure.
Rise observed on #1 D/W after 4/7 is due to N2 injection to reduce the risk of H2 explosion within the PCV in case of RPV leak (IAEA, NISA). After a few days it seems pressure has been distributed between DW and SC
Containment Atmospheric Monitoring System (CAMS) measures H2 and O2 concentration, as well as gamma radioactivity, within the Dry Well (D/W) and Suppression Chamber (S/C).
You read it right, these are “Sieverts/h“, no “mili”, nor “micro”; keep in mind CAMS measures radioactivity within the containment: that is no place for people to go around
[04/08]Unit1 CAMS sudden increase happened just before instrument malfunction and it remains unclear whether it was part of such problem or an actual reading.
[04/17] TEPCO added many new sensors, but most of them have dubious readings (A & B are two different instrumentations measuring the same thing).
[06/09] TEPCO checked #2 SC(B) sensor and determined it was broken (→ removed from graphs; you can still see its pre-check evolution here if you want).
[06/15] TEPCO believes all SC sensors but #2-B are now reliable.
Last week, Tokyo Electric Power Company (TEPCO) officials announced that they now believe essentially all the fuel in reactor 1 at Fukushima melted early in the crisis, and is now lying in a mass at the bottom of the reactor vessel. But they believe that it did not melt through the bottom of the vessel—which would have been a full “meltdown”—and that it is mostly covered with water and has achieved “stable cooling.”
TEPCO’s announcement about the extent of the fuel damage in Unit 1 came about last week when workers calibrated water-level sensors and found that the water level in the reactor vessel appears to be below the level where the bottom of the fuel rods should be in normal operation, and appears to have been that low since shortly after the earthquake and tsunami. This means that the fuel could no longer be in its usual location since without cooling it would have melted.
On May 15, TEPCO released details of its current guess about what happened in the core. This analysis says that most or all of the core had melted and relocated to the bottom of the reactor vessel within 16 hours of the time the reactor shut down. This analysis assumes the cooling system “lost its function after the tsunami arrived at around 15:30,” so relocation of the fuel happened within 15 hours of the end of cooling.
Figure 1 below shows what TEPCO believes the water level was in the Unit 1 reactor during the first 33 hours of the crisis, according to its new analysis (the vertical dotted lines mark 6-hour increments). The red lines show the top and bottom of the fuel assemblies under normal “active” conditions.
According to Figure 1, the water level dropped to the level of the bottom of the fuel within about 4 hours after the earthquake hit and the reactor shut down. And it stayed there despite workers’ attempts to pump first fresh water and then sea water into the reactor. It has apparently stayed at that level since then, although faulty readings from the water-level sensors led workers to believe it was actually much higher. The fact that the water level was this low despite water being pumped into the reactor suggests the cooling water is leaking out.
I’ve marked the time of the explosion in Unit 1, believed to be due to hydrogen created by the damaged fuel, which occurred at 3:30 pm on March 12. This is about 20 hours after TEPCO believes the fuel was exposed to air.
The water level in Unit 1 is believed to have dropped much faster than for Units 2 and 3.
But Dave Lochbaum notes that Unit 1 had a different “water makeup system”—which is used to keep water levels where they should be—than Units 2 and 3. Moreover, even if the cooling system had not been shut off by a worker, it would have failed shortly on its own.
This is what Dave says about the makeup systems:
Unit 1 did not have the steam-driven vessel makeup system that was installed and used on Units 2 and 3. Unit 1 had what is called an isolation condenser to perform vessel water inventory control and vessel pressure control (see Figure 2).
The isolation condenser is a large tank of water. If the normal makeup flow of water to the reactor vessel is lost, battery-powered valves open to allow steam produced by decay heat in the reactor core to flow through thousands of tubes in the isolation condenser.
That steam is condensed back into water and flows by gravity to the reactor vessel. This process controls the amount of water in the pressure vessel, since it limits the steam (and thus water) lost through relief valves to the torus (which is part of the primary containment vessel).
This process also controls the reactor vessel pressure, since the water in the isolation condenser absorbs decay heat that would otherwise cause the pressure inside the reactor vessel to rise.
But the water inside the isolation condenser is of finite volume. In less than 90 minutes after a reactor shut down from 100 percent power, the decay heat from the reactor core will have warmed that water to the point of boiling and begun to boil it away. Boiling water reactors with isolation condensers are supposed to use electric powered pumps to refill the isolation condenser tanks well before its water boils away. Workers at Fukushima had no pumps available to top off the tank after the earthquake took away the normal power supply and the tsunami took away the backup power supply.
With the loss cooling from the isolation condenser, the decay heat from the reactor core boiled away the water from the reactor vessel, exposing the fuel in the reactor core.
Units 2 and 3 would have used their steam-driven makeup pumps to control the reactor vessel water inventory and pressure for at least 8 hours after the tsunami damaged the backup power supplies, until their batteries were depleted. Depending on whether the Unit 1 was shut down or boiled dry, it was 6 to 8 hours ahead of them on the path to reactor core damage.
Figure 2: A schematic showing the isolation condenser at the upper left. The blue lines show the water flow from the reactor vessel—the cylinder on the right surrounded by the inverted lightbulb shape, which is the primary containment vessel.
It’s worth noting that modeling of the crisis indicates that meltdowns should have occurred at all three reactors (1. 2, and 3), given the length of time they were all without cooling. The modeling also suggests that without cooling the molten fuel would have melted through the bottom of the reactor vessel about 7 hours after the fuel relocated to the bottom of the vessel. TEPCO says that cooling water was injected in to prevent this. According to Figure 1, the injection of cooling water started about 10 hours after the water level dropped below the bottom of the fuel in the reactor.
Finally, much of the confusion about what’s happening in the reactors results from the lack of operating or trustworthy monitoring sensors, since many of the sensors were damaged by the earthquake or tsunami. This illustrates the need for diverse, reliable monitoring equipment backed by sound guidance for the operators to apply in event of unavailable or inaccurate instrumentation readings. The lack of reliable sensors was a problem after the TMI accident in 1979, and remains a problem more than 30 years later.
About the author: Dr. Wright received his PhD in physics from Cornell University in 1983, and worked for five years as a research physicist. He was an SSRC-MacArthur Foundation Fellow in International Peace and Security in the Center for Science and International Affairs in the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard, and a Senior Analyst at the Federation of American Scientists. He is a Fellow of the American Physics Society (APS) and a recipient of APS Joseph A. Burton Forum Award in 2001. He has been at UCS since 1992. Areas of expertise: Space weapons and security, ballistic missile proliferation, ballistic missile defense, U.S. nuclear weapons and nuclear weapons policy
Support from UCS members make work like this possible. Will you join us? Help UCS advance independent science for a healthy environment and a safer world.