Chernobyl CIA Files.pdf
Now, the Secret CIA FILES was opened
CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR ACCIDENT DOCUMENTS
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The Chernobyl' Accident:
Social and Political
Implications
Summary
Informa/available
as of Deccember 1987
was used in his report.
171/224
The explosion of the Chernobyl' nuclear reactor in April 1986 presented a
serious problem for Gorbachev's efforts to portray the new leadership as a
reasonable and accountable government. The accident led to the emergence
of nuclear energy policy as a significant public issue. Moscow's delay
in reporting the accident to its people and neighbors left it open to charges
of disregard for public health and eroded confidence in the regime. The
psychological consequences of the Chernobyl' accident are likely to be long
term and not limited to the immediately affected geographic areas.
Soviet citizens-in contrast to their counterparts in the West-have not
mounted a successful campaign against the 'development of nuclear power,
but antinuclear sentiment is growing in the aftermath of the Chernobyl'
accident. Some members of the elite with policy influence have much less
confidence in the safety of the Soviet nuclear system. Even ordinary
citizens apparently worry that the regime's determination to'rely more
heavily on nuclear power will increase pressure on the nuclear sector to
place growth above safety. They are reluctant to trust official assurances
that safety alterations have been made and that existing safety rules will be
enforced.
Regime claims that radiation fallout from Chernobyl' will not add
significantly to the normal incidence of cancer have not silenced rumors
and anxiety about health issues. A large segment of the population living in
the European section of the USSR apparently believes it is in danger from
radiation and continues to link genetic abnormalities, cancers, and poor
health in general to the accident. These concerns are probably greatest
among the 135,000 evacuees and more than 20,000 recovery workersmainly
military reservists-nearly all of whom are non-Russians.
We have evidence of considerable fear of contaminated food and water that
is likely to continue. The effects of this fear were still being felt in the farmers'
markets this past summer, and Moscow probably is concerned that
this apprehension could result in workers' resistance to transfers to the
Chernobyl' region, an inability to sell products from the region, and
increased demand for medical services
,:' Chernobyl' also had an 'adverse impact on the regime's credibility. More
, than a year after the accident, Soviet citizens continue to criticize top
officials for initially concealing the Chernobyl' accident, and some think
the regime's response to the disaster exposed the insincerity of Gorhachev's
openness (glasnost) policy.
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The regime brought many of these problems on itself by initially reacting
with its traditional secrecy. Immediately after the accident, an information
blackout was imposed until international pressure forced a grudging
admission followed by a propaganda counterattack. Gorbachev himself
remained silent until 14 May, almost three weeks after the accident,
. probably to minimize his personal responsibility and to wait for his experts
to gain control of the situation. 'r}
Once Gorbachev got involved, however, he exploited the initial public
relations setback to push his own reform agenda. By demonstrating that
suppressing information about domestic problems can backfire, the accid'ent
gave added impetus to his drive for openness in the Soviet media. Several
articles in Pravda, for example, pointed out that a lack of complete information
had encouraged harmful rumors, and supporters of Gorbachev's
policy criticized the domestic media's early silence.
Gorbachev also ~ed the accident to eliminate some Brezhnev holdovers.
He retired three elderly members of the Central Committee who were
rumored to share some blame for the disaster. In addition, several ministrylevel
officials in the nuclear industry were fired, six Chemobyl' plant J
managers received jail sentences, and 27 party officials were expelled fr<>m
the party either for contributing to the accident or Jor being inattentive to
the evacuees' needs.
By laying the blame on local authorities, attacking the West for exploiting
the disaster, and pressing forward with domestic reform, Gorb~chev has so
far largely avoided personal accountability. ( .--.. ' .....
;l Gorbachev favored prompt publiCation of information
bui met resistance in the Politburo. However, this story conceivably
was put out by his supporters to exonerate him "'1
The costs to regime credibility were especially serious in the Ukraine,
Belorussia, and the Baltic. Dissatisfaction with the regime's handling of the
Chernobyl' accident exacerbated longstanding popular frustrations in these
regions:
• The nuclear radioactive contamination of Ukrainian and Belorussian
territory and the dislocation of Ukrainian and Belorussian people provoked
dissatisfaction with the Soviet policy of placing nuclear plants near
populated Centers and strengthened the environmentalist lobby in the
Ukraine.
• Chernobyl' sparked demonstrations in the Baltic, where ecology-sensitive
issues had already provoked anti-Russian demonstrations and Moscow's
callup of reservists to clean up Chernobyl' was perceived as ethnic
discrimination.
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The new consciousness about environmental issues spurred by Chernobyl'
has contributed to a climate of public activism that could contest Moscow's
plans for nuclear power expansion in the next decade. Some 60 members of
the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences signed a petition opposing the
completion of units 5 and 6 at Chernobyl' because the project leaders had
failed to adjust their plans to the new postaccident conditions. Reportedly,
the petition was about to be made public when Moscow decided to shelve
the expansion plans for the nuclear plant, conceivably in response to the
arguments advanced by the Ukrainian group and possibly other public
opposition.
Local Soviet press accounts indicate that concern about the safety of the
nuclear industry is particularly high in areas with Chernobyl'-type reactors,
like Kursk, Leningrad, Smolensk, Ignalina, and Chernobyl' itself.
Demonstrations against the Ignalina and Leningrad nuclear plants were·
held in June 1986 as well as this year, and there is evidence that two nuclear
projects have been recently shelved because of public reaction. Even
though there have been greater efforts to reassure the public and perhaos
some rethinkin2 of the strategy Cor siting nuclear power plants, .C .:I
C _ ::Jlhe public's apprehension about the regime's
commitment to make the necesSary safety modifications remains well J
founded. I ....
Despite the fact that ministries responsible for nuclear industry have been
given a formal mandate to achieve more stringent safety standards, there is
no indication that public resentment will compel changes in the direction of
Soviet nuclear power policy. The major bureaucracies resent public
pressure and there are some signs of backtracking on glasnost:
• Despite Moscow's avowed openness policy, the July 1987 legal Collowup
of the accident was conducted in secret, probablY in an effort to avoid revealing
technical testimony that addressed. reactor design flaws.
• In the spring of 1987, Soviet reporters complained that the authorities
were still tightly controlling inCormation on Chernobyl" leaving the
public largely in the dark.
• The official Soviet report presented to the International Atomic Energy
I Agency at the August 1986 meeting in Vienna, and made widely
av~il"hlc to the West, was never released to the Soviet general public.
Soviet leaders probably hope that the consequences of Chernobyl' will fade
from public view. Continued publicity poses difficulties because long-term
environmental and health consequences will require further allocations of
resources, which Moscow appears unwilling to make. A debate about the
174/224
location and safety of nuclear plants is troublesome to a regime formally
committed to nuclear energy and the economic benefits of building nuclear
plants near highly populated areas. (
In an era of continued reform policies, another nuclear mishap, even a
comparatively minor one, could unleash a backlash against nuclear energy
that would- be harder to ignore and might haste~ the process of retiring the
Chernobyl'-type (RBMK) reactor:
• The democratization campaign unveiled by Gorbachev, Yakovlev, and
other senior leaders presupposes more sensitivity to public opinion .
• Legislation presented at the June 1987 Supreme Soviet on public
referendums on local issues may give the people a mechanism to express
their concerns.
• Public groups have been able to exert pressure on other env!conmentrelated
issues through mass demonstrations.
• Some critics of current nuclear policy, including prominent journalists,
probably can be more .nftuential under glasnost.
In addition, the Gorbachev regime has issued a number of broader policy
statements designed to curb pollution and improve health and apt'C<lrs
-willing to provide resources to support these policies. In July 1987, the
CPSU Central Committee issued a sweeping resolution on ecology aimed
at improving safety in the workplace and the quality of air and water. A
month later, it announced a crash program to improve the medical system.
The new Law on the Restructuring of Public Health stresses major reforms
in the area of health through prevention and, given the growing concern
with pollution and industrial safety, may be implemented more rapidly
than usual. I
Accommodation to popular frustration carries a danger for the regime and
could make the situation worse by exciting expectations. The population
will be more attentive to future regime performance in the areas of nuclear
safety, public health, and ecology. There is increased discussion of these
issues in the intellectual community, and social initiative groups are taking
the issues to the street. These concerns are not likely-to evaporate. As
public dissatisfaction becomes more evident, the Chemobyl' accident may
provide a focal point around which disgruntled citizens can organize, and
Moscow may discover that Chernobyl' is a continuing irritsmt with a
potential for social and ethnic tensions Cor years to come.
=======================================================
CIA SPECIAL COLLECTIONS
RELEASE AS SANITIZED
2000
208/224
MEMORANDUM FOR:
SUBJECf:
See Distribution
Problems With Radioactive Waste at Soviet
Defense Sites
The attached memorandum was prepared at the request of the Depanment of
Energy to suppon the upcoming visit of nuclear waste management experts to the
Soviet Union. The infonnation used is widely available in the Soviet Union and is the
focus of the current public debate on Soviet defense waste management practices.
Director
Scientific and Weapons Research
209/224
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
30 May 1990
USSR: Problems With Radioactive Waste
at Defense Sites
Summary
Environmental problems caused by radioactive waste exist at the
So.·iet plutoniwn production complexes at Chelyabinsk-40 and Tomsk.
Complete disregard for the potential hazards of radioactive waste in the
late 194 Os and continuing until the 1960s created contamination problems
in extent and severity that are rivaled only by the Cherrwby/' disaster. At
the plutoniwn production site at Krasnoyarsk, there is controversy over a
plan to inject radioactive waste from a power reactor fuel reprocessing
plant into the ground.
•••••
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Background
The Soviet Ministry of Nuclear Energy and Industry, which was established in the
summer of 1989, controls the sites producing defense waste. Before the Ministry's
formation, all aspects of the nuclear fuel cycle, all defense-related nuclear sites, and a
few power reactors were under the Minisoy of Medium Machine Building (MSM). The
remaining power reactors had been operated by the Ministry of Atomic Power since
1986. Until then, when control was shifted in response to the Chemobyl' accident, the
Ministry of Power and Electrification had owned and operated most Soviet power
reactors. Although Yevgeniy P. Velikhov urged that the MSM name be retained for
sentimental reasons, the expanded organization was renamed the Ministry of Nuclear
Energy and Industry. Although the minisoy name change. occurred almost a year ago,
discu~~ions in local papers and debates still refer to the defense nuclear sites as being run
by the MSM.
Problems with the handling and disposal of wastes at three defense sites currently
are being debated. At Chelyabinsk-40, near Kyshtym, and at Tomsk, the problems are
with stored defense waste from plutonium production. At the plutonium production site
at Krasnoyarsk, the controversy is over a plan to inject radioactive waste from a power
reactor fuel reprocessing plant into the ground.
Chelyabinsk-40
Chelyabinsk-40 is not marked on maps of the Soviet Union. Once the city bore
the name of Beria. Today, the city, and the adjacent defense enterprise, the Mayak.
(Banner) Chemical Combine, are usually called Chelyabinsk-40. It was at this site that
Igor Vasilyevich Kurchatov, working under Beria, built the Soviet Union's first
plutonium production reactor. Here also, Academician V. G. Khlopin and workers from
the Radium Institute completed the first chemical plant for the separation of plutonium
from irradiated uranium.
The first reactor, "A" reactor, was graphite moderated with 1,1158 channels. (In
comparison, the first US plutonium production reactor, B-Reactor at Hanford., has 2,004
channels.) "A" reactor, sometimes referred to as "Anna," began operation on
19 June 1948. The reprocessing plant began operation later that year. The second
reactor at Chelyabinsk-40 was heavy water moderated. Shortly after this reactor, which
was designed by Academician AbrcUIl Alikhanov, began operation, the heavy water in the
two heat exchangers froze. Yefrim Pavlovich Slavskiy, then complex chief engineer and
later Minister of Medium Machine Building, claims he had to enter the radiation area and
place his hand on one of the heat exchangers to convince the designers that the heavy
water had frozen.
A total of five graphite-moderated reactors were built at Chelyabinsk-40. The
701 reactor. a small 65-megawatt (MW) reactor with 248 channels, began operation on
22 December 1951. On 15 December 1952 the 501 reactor began operation; The "A"
reactor and the 701 reactor were decommissioned in 1987. Two other larger graphite·
moderated plutonium production reactors are located in a separate area of the complex.
One of these reactors was decommissioned on 12 August 1989. That reactor, which has
2,001 channels, is larger than the "A" reactor.
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A nuclear fuel reprocessing and storage factory for power reactor fuel, submarine
reactorfuel, and fuel from nuclear icebreakers also is located at the complex.
Radioactive waste from this plant is converted into special glass, placed in stainless steel
containers, and stored in cans in a special storage facility at the site.
Discharge of Waste into the Techa River
According to the official report, "During the fU"St years of the operation of the
enterprise in this branch of industry there was no experience or scientific development of
questions of protecting the health of the personnel or the environment. Therefore, during
the fifties there was pollution of individual parts of the territory and around the
enterprise." These bland words actually mean that from its beginning in 1948 through
September 1951 all radioactive waste from the radiochemical plant that reprocessed
irradiated fuel and recovered the plutonium was discharged directly into the Techa River.
In 1951, after radioactivity was found as far away as the Arctic Ocean, a new
solution was adopted. Instead of discharging the radioactive waste into the Techa River,
the wastes were dumped into Karachay Lake. The Techa River and all its floodlands
were excluded from use. The inhabitants of some settlements were evacuated, in other
affected settlements, work was performed to supply people with water from other
sources. A series of artificial reservoirs were created to isolate water from the most
contaminated areas. The first reservoir was erected in 1951 and the fourth in 1964.
Lake Karachay
Beginning in 1951 "medium-level activity" waste, including nitrate and uranium
salts, was discharged into this natural lake. The lake eventually accumulated 120 million
curies of the long-lived radionuclides cesium-137 and strontium-90. In the 1960s it was
discovered that radioactivity from the lake was entering the ground water. Effons to
eliminate the reservoir began in 1967. The lake still exists, although its area has been
reduced. Today, radioactivity in the ground water has migrated from 2 to 3 kilometers
from the lake. On the lake shore in the region near the discharge line,. radioactivity is
about 600 roentgens per hour.
Waste Explosion in 1957
For two years radioactive waste had been stored in 300--cubic-meter vessels were
called "permanent storage containers." These containers had walls that were 1.5 meters
thick and lined with stainless steel. The containers had a special ventilation and cooling
system. The cooling failed in one of the containers, however, and the waste began to dry
out. Nitrates and acetates in the waste precipitated. heated up, and, on
29 September 1957, exploded. The meter-thick concrete lid was blown off. and 70 to 80
tons of waste containing some 20 million curies of radioactivity were ejected. About
90 percent fell out in the immediate vicinity of the vessel. The remaining 2 million
curies formed a kilometer-high radioactive cloud that was carried through Chelyabinsk.
Sverdlovsk, and Tumen Oblasts. About 23,000 square lcilometers were contaminated.
Radiation levels within 100 meters of the crater exceeded 400 roentgens per hour. At a
kilometer the levels were 20 roentgens per hour, and at 3 kilometers the levels were
3 roentgens per hour. Guards received the largest reported dose, about 100 roentgens.
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There were 217 towns and villages with a combined population of 270,000 inside
the area contaminated to 0.1 Curie-pel-square-kilometeror greater (map). Virtually all
water-supply sources were contaminated. Calculations indicated that the cumulative
dose over the first month for the three most contaminated villages would range from 150
to 200 roentgens. These villages, in which about 1,100 people lived, were evacuated, but
evacuation was not completed until 10 days after the accident.
The next wave of evacuations was conducted over a half year period beginning
about one year after the accident, from areas where the slI'Ontium-90 contamination
l;xceeded 4 Curies-per-square-kilometer. These people consumed contaminated foods for
three to six months without restriction and continued to consume some contaminated
food until their evacuation. Inhabitants of 19 populated areas, about 10,000 people, were
evacuated.
The maximum average dose of radiation received before evacuation reached
17 roentgen equivalent man (rems) from external radiation and 52 rems of equivalent
effective dose. One-fifth of the people living in the area affected by the release showed
reduced leucocytes in the blood, and, in rare cases, thrombocyte levels also were reduced.
No deviations in the incidence of diseases of the blood and in the incidence of malignant
tumors have been registered.
1967 Contamination Event
In 1967 wind dispersed radioactivity from the shores of Lake Karachay around
the reactor site, creating strontium-90 levels of up to 10 curies per square kilometer.
The Situation Today
Parts of the site have a dose rate of up to 15 milliroentgens per hour. The average
value for the remainder of the site is in the range of 10 to 30 microroentgens per hour.
The Techa River is cordoned off with a wire fence and people are forbidden to catch fish,
pick mushrooms or berries, or cut the hay. There are 450 million cubic meters of
radioactive water in open reservoirs.
The South Urals Project
The South Urals Nuclear Power Station is, in the words of Selskaya Zhizin "in a
bright birch grove, which guards the secret of the Ural [radioactive] trace." The nuclear
station was being built by the Ministry of Medium Machine Building. Two
BN-800-type liquid-metal-<:ooled, fast-breeder reactors were under construction and a
third was planned. The nuclear power station was intended to provide employment for
the skilled workers who have lost or will lose their jobs as plutonium-producing reactors
are shut down.
The production complex, by consuming contaminated water for its needs,
regulates the water level in the lakes. With three reactors shut down and two others to
close, a new danger was identified--overfilling the reservoirs with natural water and
possibly even failure of the dams, sending contaminated water into the rivers of the Ob
basin. The South Urals nuclear power station was to avert this sort of catastrophe by
using radioactive water to cool turbine condensers, thus increasing evaporation.
213/224
construction. although some critics claim that the real reason is that the Ministry
ran out of funds. In the public mind, constructive dialog on the nuclear power station is
impossible without learning the truth about the ecological impact of Mayak Chemical
Combine. particularly the 1957 explosion.
Tomsk
The closed city of Tomsk-7 is the location of the Siberian Atomic Power Station.
In 1955. at the International Conference on Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy, the Soviets
described the reactors at this station as being solely for electric power generation. In
1981. A. M. Petrosyants. then Chainnan of the State Committee for Utilization of Atomic
Energy, admitted that these reactors served a dual purpose--plutonium production and
power generation. Not until 4 May 1990 did the Soviets reveal that the reactors were at
Tomsk. The reactors described in 1955 were graphite moderated. water cooled. and with
2,101 channels. Thus, they are slightly larger than the reactor shut down in 1989 at the
Chelyabinsk-40 complex.
Problems with defense waste at Tomsk date back to the 1970s. At that time, a
senior engineer for "monitoring stOCktaking and storage of special output" discovered a
"vast quantity of radioactive output" at the plant. Izvestiya claims that his letter to the
Central Committee and L. I. Brezhnev only resulted in his reprimand and threatened
expt11sion from the party. Not until 18 April 1990, when Tomsk-7 radio warned that
people had been contaminated. did the public learn of this problem.
Izvestiya also reported that the radioactive waste burial site is poorly fenced and
contaminated water areas are not fenced at all. Elk. hare. duck. and fish are
contaminated. and 38 people were found to have higher than permissible levels of
radioactive substances in their body. Of these 38. four adults and three children have
been hospitaliz.ed.
Krasnoyarsk
In the early 1950s. Stalin authorized the building of a "radiochemical enterprise"
for producing plutonium on the mountainous shores of the Yenisey River in the Siberian
taiga. Thus was born the mining-chemical combine and. along with it, a closed city.
Fifteen years ago it was resolved to add an irradiated fuel-storage facility and a
reprocessing plant for l000-MW pressurized water reactor fuel (VVER-l000) and
"other" reactors at this site. Controversy about the 1.5QO..metric-ton-per-year
reprocessing plant, known as site 27, has resulted in the project being postponed. In
1une 1989. Komsomo!skaya PraYda reported that some 60,000 people in Krasnoyarsk
signed a protest. In part, they were angered by the revelation that the scientific study
justifying the appropriateness of the site 'Was actually produced nine years after
construction started. The site is about 30 percent complete and was originally scheduled
to stan reprocessing in 1997.
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A key feature of the site is the method of handling radioactive waste. According
to Moscow Trud waste is 10 be injected between layers of clay at a depth of 700 meters.
The injection location is some 20 kIn from the site of the reprocessing plant on the
opposite side of the Yenisey River. Some 50 meters under the river, a tunnel has already
been completed to carry the waste. It is the tunnel and the decision to inject liquid waste
into the ground that is the focus of the controversy.
